Prompt and Utter Destruction: An End to War
Historical research can only be as conclusive as the available resources allow. In the case of the debate surrounding the initial use of the atomic bomb, over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, a tempest has developed in more recent years as more documents have come to the light of public scrutiny. The results of all the available resources regarding Truman’s decision to use the bomb are essentially inconclusive, as none can ultimately determine that using the bomb would or would not have been the best expedient to end the war. The reason for this relates to the goal one would judge as being the most significant, out of the tangle of interconnected objectives Truman sought as World War II came to a close. With different historians emphasizing different objectives, it is little wonder that no consensus seems possible to end the debate surrounding Truman’s fateful decision. Even without a final and clear understanding, though, the available resources most certainly allow a fairly complete insight into the events of the days leading up to the employment of the new weapon, and the subsequent surrender of Japan.
J. Samuel Walker explores this progression and debate in his book, Prompt & Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan. The primary concern in debating Truman’s decision revolves around determining which of Truman’s war objectives was the most important. Clearly, for Truman, the most important objective was to end the war as soon as possible, at the lowest cost of American lives. As evidenced at the Potsdam conference, Truman gave this objective primary consideration, with all other factors and objectives mattering less. As proof of this, Truman allowed his top officials to handle many of the other issues at Potsdam, including some of the main points of foreign policy, like dealing with the Soviets and the question of unconditional surrender. These were large questions, but were less important to Truman than the overarching problem of saving American lives on the battlefield.
However, this is not to say that Truman paid no attention to the diplomatic ramifications of the United States’ new and potent weapon. While at Potsdam, the successful testing of an atomic bomb at Trinity gave Truman more muscle to negotiate with Great Britain and Stalin, which he did not fail to use. Upon learning of the bomb’s successful test, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill remarked, “Now I know what happened to Truman yesterday…. He told the Russians just where they got on and off and generally bossed the whole meeting.” With what he felt was more leverage, Truman was more confident in negotiating with Churchill and Stalin at Potsdam. This American confidence carried on, beyond Potsdam, to their general operation of foreign policy, as seen at a later negotiation between U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov. Byrnes said to Molotov that if he would not cooperate “I am going to pull an atomic bomb out my hip pocket and let you have it.” Obviously the threat was not serious, but the fact remained that the threat of the atomic bomb was a force in the arsenal of American diplomacy.
Byrnes and Molotov’s exchange shows an example of “atomic diplomacy” and this was, indeed, one of the side effects of developing and using the atomic bomb. This result, impressing the Soviets, stemmed from one the five “fundamental considerations” Walker outlines in his book regarding Truman’s decision to employ the bombs over Japan. As has been stated, the primary objective was to end the war at the earliest opportunity at the lowest cost of American lives. The remaining considerations were secondary to this ultimate goal, yet still of importance. Probably foremost among these secondary considerations was the need to justify the great cost of the Manhattan Project. Weighing in at over $2 billion, the Manhattan Project was a major undertaking that diverted manpower and resources which could have been used elsewhere in the war effort. Had America’s wartime output not been as great as it was, the Manhattan Project likely could not have taken place; certainly no other wartime belligerent could have spared such resources while in the heat of war. Another of Truman’s considerations, noted by Walker, was a lack of incentives not to use the bomb. Walker cites the military expediency of using the bomb to quickly end the war, the diplomatic possibilities of strengthening American post-war arguments, and the political advantage of a swift end to war as all being compelling reasons to use the bomb. To counter these advantages, Truman had only moral considerations about bombing civilian targets. However, the force of this argument clearly paled when the distinction had to be made between American and Japanese casualties. This observation is related to Walker’s final “fundamental consideration,” namely, “American hatred of Japan and a need for vengeance” . Racism and hatred against the Japanese had been a factor all through the war, because of Pearl Harbor, the intensity of the Pacific War, and the sheer numbers of American casualties inflicted by the Japanese. To summarize this unfortunate reality, the words of President Truman are blunt and clear: “When you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast. It is unfortunate but true.” With such strong arguments as these to use the bomb, and relatively little other than moral conscience to counter them, employing the bomb came to be almost automatic, even if it was not inevitable. The evidence of this is that, once testing was completed, the bombs to be used against Japan were quickly moved, assembled, and ready for use within two weeks.
This is not to say that all top American officials thought using the bomb was the most viable option for ending the war. Secretary of War Henry Stimson felt that the U.S. needed to change its policy of secrecy about the atomic bomb because, if it did not, tensions with the Soviet Union would certainly increase. Stimson rightly saw that if the U.S. did not include the Soviet Union in partnership, as had been done with Great Britain, mistrust and suspicion would continue to grow, with unfortunate effects after the war. Stimson foresaw an arms race, if the U.S. surprised the USSR by using the bomb against Japan without prior consultation. Indeed, this was what the future held for the post war superpowers. To prevent this, Stimson advocated “enter[ing] an arrangement with the Russians…to control and limit the use of the atomic bomb as an instrument of war….” Rather than this, though, Truman only casually mentioned the bomb to Stalin, somewhat misleadingly saying, “the United States had developed a new weapon of ‘unusual destructive force.’” With the opportunity for disclosure and partnership thus squandered, Truman unnecessarily increased future problems between the United States and Soviet Union, contributing to the impending Cold War.
Clearly, the atomic bomb produced some debate within the U.S. government as the war was coming to a close as to whether the bomb should or should not be used. The overwhelming response was that it should be. Government officials, and specifically Harry S. Truman, working with the information then available, Walker asserts, made what they believed to be the right decision about using the bomb. It easily provided for the fulfillment of the primary objective to end the war quickly and at minimal cost of American lives. However, with later availability of more complete information, Walker questions whether the bomb was necessary to end the war. Concluding that while it indeed was the most rapid way to conclude the war, a less immediate end to the war most likely would not have cost the United States very much more by not using the bomb. In comparison to projected Japanese losses in the event of using the bomb, American patience would not have been very costly at all, given that Japan was on the brink of defeat anyway. With that in mind, the “inevitable” invasion of the Japanese homeland would not have been necessary, and the requisite casualties of invading American troops need not have occurred. In this assessment, then, using the bomb was not necessary to fulfill both parts of the primary American objective; yes, the bomb would end the war sooner, but it would not necessarily save many more American lives than merely allowing the war to follow its current progression toward Japanese defeat. Perhaps the “fundamental considerations” Walker outlines explain why the bomb was used anyway. Or perhaps Truman and the government-military complex did not have the right information to develop such a conclusion. In any case, though, whether or not using the atomic bomb was the best expedient to end the war, it did end the fighting and suffering of the Pacific campaign, if only for one side.