Truman, Choices, and the Atomic Bomb
War is one of man’s most frightful creations. Although conflict and struggle are fundamental elements of nature, conflict on the scale undertaken by humanity clearly surpasses the limitations of a natural state. The most obvious example is World War II, in which more than 45 million perished to prove the brutal effects of this evil human endeavor. The nature of modern total warfare is such that, to win, one nation must destroy the resources of its enemy to prevent its further participation in the war. To this end most available means will be employed, with the exception of those few that clearly rest apart from the reasonability of even warmongering mankind, such as chemical weapons. Today, this results from the knowledge that technology has surpassed humanity’s ability to survive its own diabolical innovations. If true total war were to be fought today, the full arsenals of the belligerents would be opened, and, in cases involving any major world power, that would mean employing nuclear weapons and unleashing their terrifying effects. The understanding for this current reservation about using nuclear weapons results from their initial use against Japan at the conclusion of WWII, when Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed.
In J. Samuel Walker’s book, Prompt & Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan, Walker examines the rationale behind the decision to use atomic bombs against Japan as a means of quickly ending the Pacific War. As complex a decision as Truman faced, several options existed as possible plans to conclude the war, not necessarily with using atomic bombs being the primary option. Walker explains that American goals were twofold: to end the war as soon as possible and to do so at the lowest possible cost in American lives. Each consideration Truman undertook was guided by these two overarching ideas. The first plan involved an invasion of Japan, a logical progression of action following the American fight through the Pacific. The plan was to invade the southernmost island of Japan, Kyushu, thereby hoping to convince the Japanese of the futility of continuing war. This plan, though, was estimated to cost more than 30,000 American lives. This estimate was probably conservative, but, at any rate, Truman knew that this invasion was to be no Pantelleria, in which Eisenhower had captured a heavily “defended” island fortress in the Mediterranean at no cost. The Italians had been ready to surrender, but the Japanese were not. They would fanatically fight to the last man, upholding the proud honor of their samurai ancestors. This devotion perhaps tempered Truman’s resolve to authorize Operation Downfall, the proposed two-phase invasion of the Japanese islands of Kyushu, under Operation Olympic, and Honshu, under Operation Coronet. The projected cost in American lives by the time Coronet came to pass stood at 46,000 deaths and 174,000 more casualties. In addition to the costs of an invasion being very high, the timetable for their successful completion projected an end to war “by the end of 1946.” For these reasons, Downfall was not an optimal plan for Truman, except that it could be expected to succeed, even though at a high cost.
The alternatives to an invasion, as Walker points out, each had drawbacks that mitigated their individual benefits. A campaign of escalated bombing and blockade, to force Japan to her knees through attrition, was expected to take far longer to produce an end to war than an invasion, although it would potentially cost fewer American lives. Waiting for the Soviet Union to join the war against Japan was another viable option. With the USSR attacking Manchuria, Japan would be unable to ship troops back to the mainland to help counter a simultaneous American invasion. However, this plan failed to pass political muster, as it would allow the Soviets to extend their power in East Asia, which the United States could not permit. The other available option was to modify the policy of unconditional surrender, which Truman had inherited from Roosevelt. Noting the Japanese reverence for the Emperor almost as a deity, Walker explains that removing him from the throne would harden the Japanese resolve to continue the war, thus precluding the chance of an early surrender. Indeed, exploring this option further may have eventually led to surrender by Japan, obviating a costly invasion. However, this course, too, had its drawbacks, including reflections on American will to fight if the perception developed that the government was willing to negotiate. In all of these cases, the proposals had merit, but were unable to provide the requisite end results to allow their implementation. As a result, Truman turned to his secret card, the atomic bomb.
As with the other options, using atomic weapons to end the war had considerable drawbacks, but none of which involved the two overarching goals of American conduction of the Pacific war: ending the war as quickly as possible with the loss of the fewest American lives. As the atomic option met these two objectives, its attractiveness as a purely military option was obvious. However, unlike any other weapon in human history, the atomic bomb had a capacity for instant and total annihilation, ramifications which desperately needed consideration. Employing atomic weapons would cause death on previously unprecedented and horrifyingly efficient scales. When the United States had firebombed Tokyo, Japanese casualties and deaths easily surpassed 100,000, mostly of noncombatants. Thus, America had shown it was able to resort to drastic measures to achieve its military goals. The destruction wrought on Tokyo in the firebombing took the concerted attack of many incendiary weapons, but their power would fail to surpass the destructive reality of a single atomic bomb. Thus, Truman had a fateful decision to make: should he employ the atomic weapons at his disposal and quickly end the war with minimal American cost, as per the objectives for conducting the war, even at the terrifying cost in Japanese lives that would certainly result? This question, more than any other concern, whether political or military, can presently be seen as the issue of fundamental importance, although at the time Truman’s fears of an invasion probably loomed even more largely. In any case, employing the atomic weapons emerged as Truman’s decision as the most effective way to end the war.
The consequences of Truman’s decision loomed largest and most immediately for the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which were both summarily destroyed at great human costs of death and suffering, respectively on August 6th and 9th, 1945. The political consequences of Truman’s decision, though less immediately important, quickly became apparent as the war concluded. Tensions with the Soviet Union were greatly exacerbated by the American use of atomic weapons. The Franck Committee, convened to explore the possibilities that might result, accurately predicted that Truman’s decision to approve the nuclear strike would far-reaching ramifications for the future of the post-war world. Advocating that a demonstration of American atomic capability take place to help calm Allied reservations, the Committee stated, “if no international agreement is concluded immediately after the first demonstration, this will mean a flying start of an unlimited armaments race.” Despite this recommendation, no such exhibition took place. It was determined that the shock value of bringing sudden annihilation to the Japanese would cause an immediate shift in their determination to continue resisting surrender. As a result, Hiroshima and Nagasaki shocked not only Japan, but also the rest of the world. Tensions with the USSR soared to new heights, and the Cold War settled in just as the ashes began to settle in the two decimated Japanese cities.
Whether modern scholars reflect favorably or not on Truman’s decision to employ the weapons of apical human destructive potential, it is impossible to know the exact reasons that propelled him to his decision. Whatever his rationale, though, it remains that his choice plotted the post-war world on a course that strayed perilously close to catastrophe for a generation or more during the Cold War. Perhaps this course was inevitable the moment Enrico Fermi sustained a fissionable chain reaction in Chicago on the afternoon of December 2, 1941, or later in Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 16, 1945 when the first atomic detonation in human history rent the morning sky with light and fire. Whatever the reason, whether ultimate accountability can be affixed to one person, Truman, or to an entire echelon of government and military, the fact remains that in the midsummer of early August 1945, the course of human history irrevocably changed. With the unbounded destructive potential released upon the homeland, Japan immediately surrendered. As the mushroom clouds dissipated, a gloom fell over the future of an uncertain world that had fallen prey to the unwitting machination of flawed human acumen.