Question 9. “The tragedy of 1914 is that the most backward or politically bankrupt parts of Europe, through the alliance system, dragged the most advanced parts into ruin.”
In the years preceding the outbreak of World War I, Europe found itself tangled in an intricate web of friendship and mistrust. The infamous alliance system that had developed among the rival military camps has been held largely responsible for causing the war. Closer inspection suggests that war might have been averted, or at least once more postponed, as had been the case in recent memory, through such crisis as the Balkan Wars. Averting the war was not to be, however, and the third crisis in the Balkans proved to be the fatal blow to peace. The sequence of events leading to the rapid succession of war declarations has been well documented, but what is less commonly known is that though Germany is generally considered to be the primary aggressor in the war, it was actually Austria’s declaration of war upon Serbia, and Russia’s subsequent declaration upon Austria that precipitated the involvement of France and Great Britain, and thus Germany’s entry into the fray to honor its pact with Austria.
Quite a query arises from more significant inspection of the comparative statuses of these European powers. Why were Russia and Austria so willing to embark upon such obviously foolish courses in response to the events in Sarajevo? Russia’s pride had been repeatedly wounded in the fallout from the Balkan Wars, and understandably would not want to default on expectations to come to the aid of its Slavic brethren. Austria, on the other hand, demanded an end to the undermining of its existence by Serbian nationalism, that great ghost of the nineteenth century. At first, both of these considerations appear to be logical; neither power would want to lose face. However, both also knew the dangers of actual military confrontation, due to the web of alliances, which would almost certainly embroil the whole of Europe in war. In truth, Austria was on the further end of its former glory as a real power in Europe, worn as it was in the fading days of King Francis Joseph’s 68 year reign. Similarly, Russia was a disorganized and mismanaged expanse of a nation ruled by an autocratic regime strangely out of place in comparison to the much more moderate rulers of the other European states. Possibly, both Austria’s and Russia’s comparative weakness led both to act more carelessly than prudence would have dictated. Expecting the assistance from their allies, Russia and Austria went to war and dragged all of Europe with them.
Question 3. “Why did Otto von Bismarck’s alliance system fail?”
Otto von Bismarck was probably the greatest diplomat (or manipulator of diplomacy) of the nineteenth century, but even in his mastery he could not have foreseen the destructive consequences of the inevitable misuse of his alliance system. Following the formative years of the modern German state, in which Chancellor Bismarck helped to create a unified and stronger state, Bismarck saw fit to best serve German interest by pursuing a policy of peace. Perceiving that Germany’s unification presented a problem to the traditional European balance of power, Bismarck felt it necessary to forge alliances with key states, in order to protect the newly united Germany. In 1879, Austria-Hungary and Germany signed a pact of mutual defense, stating that if either state were under attack by two or more states, the other would assist with military force.
The failure of this alliance system surfaced in the years immediately preceding World War I, as the powers no longer used the alliances as a means of mutual defense, but instead as a means of mutual aggravation and aggression. The most obvious example involves the circumstances leading to the War’s outbreak: the assassination in Sarajevo. With Austria and Russia both counting on the support of their allies, neither was as determined to keep the peace as they should have been. This was the natural result of applying the terms of the “defensive” alliances and using them to, instead, serve as threats backing up the demands of the government; in Austria’s case, this meant using threat of war with Germany as an argument for Russia to not intervene in Serbia; in Russia’s case, it meant that when Russia did defend Serbia, it would not have to face the Austrian (and German) counterattack alone, since it could count on both France and Great Britain to deflect significant portions of the counterattacks. By taking a defensive alliance system outside of the parameters for which it was originally created, Bismarck’s web of diplomacy had no chance of functioning, that is, to maintain the peace and prevent the war.
Question 5. In assessing the origin of the Weimar Republic (Germany 1919-1933), one noted historian has written: “All the elements that were later to amalgamate to destroy the new republic were there in 1920.” How accurate is the preceding statement? To what elements was the author of this statement referring?
For any number of reasons, the Weimar Republic, established in Germany following its surrender to the Allied Powers, failed to achieve a lasting stability and control over the nation. If not all of the elements that contributed to the fall of the Weimar Republic were yet present at the time of its convening, those elements were not long in arising. Indeed, any consideration an element might receive for helping to bring down the government must be seen in light of the fact that, as the Republic lasted only about fourteen years, those elements must have been present from close to the very beginning if they were to have much impact in the republic’s eventual demise at all.
So what were these contributing factors that so swiftly undercut the position of the Weimar Republic, leaving it ripe for the rise of Hitler’s authoritarian regime? A very basic principle that could be easily overlooked today, in our democratic era, is that the vast majority of German people did not want a democratic form of government. Instead, the victorious Allied Powers forced it upon them. In addition, this unwanted democratic government had the painful duty of signing the Treaty of Versailles, which was by no means a task desired by anyone in the government. That the Social Democrats were the actual signatories of the hated document added another layer of contempt to the peoples’ perception of the democratic government. It was no accident, either, that this was the result; the leaders of the Army avoided the shameful distinction of being signatories by deferring such an “honor” to the leading party of the Reichstag, the Social Democrats.
In addition to the whole debacle that was the Treaty of Versailles, further elements with which the Republic had to contend included: a bleak economic outlook, due to the crippling load of reparation payments to the Allies; the prevailing belief among the people that Germany really was not responsible for the war, which was partly true, since Austria played the most active role of dragging Germany into it (though not unwillingly); and the failure of the Republic to initiate reforms which would have helped to solidify their efforts to forge a new direction in government, away from the old monarchic ways of the Hohenzollern Empire. Failing to combat these factors, when possible, or if possible, contributed to the weakening of support for the Weimar Republic, leading to its eventual demise.
Question 8. “At what point did Europe reach the place where the Second World War was inevitable? Explain.”
Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was to have standing armed forces reduced to inconsequential numbers, so that France and the rest of Europe need not fear another effort by Germany to overrun the continent. The terms of the treaty, however, did not provide for the rise of Adolph Hitler. With his ascent to power, Hitler brought a whole new agenda to the fore of German foreign policy. Thoroughly repulsed by Germany’s defeat in the First World War, Hitler felt that it was his responsibility to restore Germany to glory. One hurdle he had to clear was the Treaty of Versailles, which he did by ignoring the restrictions on military forces and rearming. Now that Germany once again had a military, it became possible to have war.
However, the mere existence of a military does not automatically create a state of war. Arriving at that juncture was primarily the work of Hitler, as he challenged the reluctant former Allied Powers through a series of actions. When Germany reoccupied the Rhineland, an area demilitarized under the Treaty of Versailles, Great Britain and France objected, but did not object to the point of confrontation. Hitler challenged Allied resolve again in the coming years, through his actions involving the annexations of Austria and of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. Following the lead of Neville Chamberlain, the Allies willingness to appease Hitler seemed to be rivaled only by Hitler’s willingness to demand more concessions. As a result, war became inevitable. Hitler’s appetite knew no bounds, and as a result, he pressed the issue more and more often, until he actually invaded Poland to begin the Second World War.
Question 6. “How and why did the Soviet Union emerge as a threat to the security of Western Europe and the western world in general after 1945? What steps were taken by western nations to counter this threat? What leadership role did the United States play in this area?”
Two nations arose from the aftermath of World War II having attained statuses as superpower nations: the United States and the Soviet Union. Immediately, a rivalry sprang forth between the two, as both sought to be dominant in the realms of foreign and economic policy. The rivalry did not end here, though, as it also bred fear of the other’s military power. This fear, a central theme throughout the Cold War, was a driving factor in the continuous quest for security for the next forty-plus years after 1945. More than any other single factor contributing to this widespread concern about the Soviet Union, to the United States and its western European allies, was the USSR’s successful development and testing of the atomic bomb by 1949. Immediately, the quest for security against the other superpower forced the United States and Soviet Union to each pursue a program of massive nuclear stockpiling. An effect of this, whether intended or not, was that a stasis developed, such that the nuclear weapons had become a deterrent of actual military confrontation between the two superpowers, due to a mutually assured destruction of likely global import.
In addition to the entire nuclear weapon plight, Western Europe found that having the Soviet Union in such close proximity, with its substantial standing army, presented new security issues that required address. To counter any possible Soviet threats to the Continent, western nations formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO operated, initially, under predominantly American forces in Europe, as the European states were still in the process of recovering from the war, including rebuilding their military strength. In addition to the protection afforded by the American presence in NATO, the United States helped to reconstruct the shambles of the devastated European economies, via the Marshall Plan. Finally, in order to solidify and direct the focus of American foreign policy, the Truman Doctrine plotted the United States on a mission to combat the spread of communism on a global scale. As the only nation with the resources to rival those of the Soviet Union, the Truman Doctrine committed America to the task of preserving the security of the western world, by containing the communist disease.
Works Cited
Palmer, R.R, and Colton, Joel: A History of the Modern World Since 1815. 1995. McGraw Hill, Inc. New York.
Shirer, William L.: The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: a History of Nazi Germany. 1950. The Ballantine Publishing Group. New York.
Rubinstein, Alvin Z.: Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II. 1989. Scott, Foresman and Company. Glenview, Illinois.