Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Czech Accession to the European Union (EU)

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Introduction

As the European Union (EU) integrates its functions internally among existing members while, at the same time, planning expansion to include new members, the question and implications of a common foreign policy become more significant. Does the EU have the potential to become an effective foreign policy actor in crises either within Europe or on the doorstep of Europe? If the need for common foreign policy plans emerge, will the involved nations possess the capability to achieve meaningful objectives? What will increased activity by EU institutions in the defense policy area do to traditional NATO structures and even to the traditional leading role of the United States? One way of answering these questions involves examination of individual nation-state cases. In this particular study, the Czech Republic will constitute the exclusive case study.

As one of the three Central European countries to enter NATO in 1999, the leadership and people of the Czech Republic have already had to broaden their foreign and defense policy horizons. In addition, the Czechs have, for several years, been ranked in the first tier of nations likely to be admitted in the near future to the EU. Further, Czech experiences in the twentieth century have prepared them to balance national and regional pressures. Past difficulties in protecting their national autonomy have made them particularly sensitive to the costs of joining regional organizations that have foreign

policy missions. Thus, their ability to contribute to the Common Foreign and Defense Policy (CFSP) is considerable, but their doubts and concerns are weighty ones as well.

The first and foundation issue is the general evolution of Czech foreign policy since the break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1993. Only four years after the "Velvet Revolution" of 1989, the Czechs and Slovaks went their separate ways. This made their experience somewhat different than that of other, neighboring post-communist states. Both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union broke up at the same time that communist control ended. East Germany became part of the larger Germany immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the Czech case, post-communist evolution has been a two-step process. During the second stage, the leaders have needed to carve out a new identity while simultaneously dealing with the residue of the delayed split and the questions about post-communist politics and economics as well. In the midst of this confusion, the pull of the West has been a powerful one.

A related issue is the role of the new and old political parties in the process of foreign policy formation. Throughout the decade of the 1990s most of the political parties developed both general orientations and specific policy positions on the question of Czech involvement in its neighborhood and even in the wider region. The change in government control that occurred in 1998 coincided with the final negotiations about NATO membership. Those elections also took place at just the time that discussions about potential EU membership became more serious. Public opinion polls in the years 2000 and 2001 reveal an electorate that remains divided about the government elected in 1998. The population is also fractured in its attitudes about the desirability of joining the EU. Thus, it is clear that political party differences can have important consequences.

Initially, the West European Union (WEU) offered the potential to link Czech aspirations and capabilities with those of surrounding states to strengthen collaboration on security matters. Soon, the natural desire for NATO membership began to complicate the defense picture. While the prospect of joining the EU is a beckoning one principally for economic reasons, defense issues within that organization take on a new and different hue from either the WEU or NATO. Confusion over roles but also the sparkling appeal of EU membership generated conflicting pressures on the Czech leaders. All of the internal debates have taken place in a context of continuing crisis in the nearby Balkans. The Bosnian War was occurring at exactly the time that the Czech Republic became a separate nation. The NATO campaign in Kosovo took place literally weeks after the accession of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary into NATO. Now, as the EU makes plans for the final steps in the accession process for top candidates in the next few years, the ethnic conflict in Macedonia and in Yugoslavia boils in more rapid fashion.

With the Czech case as the principal center-point of discussion, it is also important to stand back and take a look at the evolving concept and machinery of the CFSP, from the vantage point of EU goals. Those continuing conflicts in the Balkans have consistently raised questions about European timidity. Why was it necessary for the Clinton Administration in the United States to conjure up the Dayton Conference as well as the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo? Clinton's replacement by President George Bush in 2001 made more pointed the need for a coordinated European strategy. The incoming American Administration was clear that the United States would be more reluctant to take the lead in future fire-fighting missions. What machinery would Europe possess by itself in future crises? At the Nice Summit in December, 2000, much press

attention focused on the discussion of a European Rapid Reaction Force. How would such a structure affect Czech aspirations?

The impact on the Czech Republic of participation in the CFSP could be a double-edged sword, and that is precisely why the Czechs have debated the topic with such vigor. On the one hand, the Czech Republic could move to a position of greater regional leadership. Humanitarian and human rights matters would lend themselves particularly to Czech involvement and interest. At the same time, there is a fear that the Czechs could lose some of their hard-won independence and freedom. Would their leaders truly be able to distance themselves or even cast a veto over actions that a majority of other nearby states favored? Would the Czech Republic need to devote too great a portion of spare financial resources to problem solving that might seem marginal to the national interest?

Finally, it is vital to analyze the relationship between NATO obligations and upcoming CFSP responsibilities that will come with EU membership. Like many other European nations, the Czech Republic could be cross-pressured between these two alliances. There is a need to explore such themes as the use of CFSP capabilities in potential situations in which the United States is doubtful or opposed. There exist difficult questions about the use of NATO infrastructure in missions solely organized by the EU. Overlapping missions may develop in which both regional organizations have a mission and a stake. In order to resolve these complications and dispel this confusion, Czech leaders will need both clear objectives and a strong will.

Czech Foreign Policy after 1993

In the period immediately after the break-up of the Czechoslovak state, a key foreign policy concern was the prospect of joining NATO. Very soon, in 1994, NATO offered the Czech Republic the chance to participate in the Partnership for Peace Program (P4P). The Czech Republic joined on March 15, 1994 (Pezl, May, 1994). Real membership in the alliance raised a number of important questions. Would NATO continue on as a provider of national security, or would it evolve mainly into a protector of freedom and democracy? Czechs also raised concerns about the prospect for a new East/West split in Central Europe. There were also worries about the reaction of Russia, a future role for the Ukraine, Russian-Ukrainian relations, the position of Slovakia, and Balkan instability further south. Clearly, in 1993-94 the Czechs were debating the issue of NATO rather than simply clamoring to get in. In fact, some analysts outlined what a foreign policy without NATO membership would look like. Such a foreign policy might entail links to other medium-sized states, engagement with Germany, moral ties to the United States, efforts to reassure Russia, and strengthening of the Visegrad Group (Gabal, January, 1994).

By 1995 Czechs began to put aside some of the doubts about NATO entry and focus more specifically on the mechanics of joining the alliance. For example, they had been in the habit of thinking principally in terms of bilateral diplomacy. Now there was a realization that the new multilateralism would possess different requirements. Two of those new challenges involved defining clearly what the eastern border of NATO would be and preparing the Czech Army for missions that would be quite different from those in the Cold War (Zieleniec, January, 1995). Further, NATO admission would contain the

attractive feature of strengthening a North Atlantic tie that included the United States (Pick, January, 1996).

By 1996 there were some thinkers who tried to assess the evolution of Czech foreign policy in the brief period of three years after the separation from Slovakia (Pech and Winkler, April, 1996). They argued that it was difficult for Czechs to adjust to the geopolitics of the newly changed state. Mentally, Czechs had been used to a larger state that penetrated further east. In contrast, after the break-up the state was smaller and also pushed geographically to the west. Others went so far as to say that the Czech Republic had fallen into a fourth category of states, lower even than Poland and Hungary (Eichler, January, 1993). With these changes the foreign policy agenda became somewhat different. New issues emerged between 1993 and 1996, and they included steps to join the EU, membership in P4P and potentially NATO, closer ties to important western states, further work on delicate relations with Germany, efforts to calm down Russia, establishment of new trade links to neighboring countries, and a greater willingness to contribute to the solution of regional conflicts that included humanitarian dimensions. Membership of the Czech Republic on the Security Council of the United Nations as a non-permanent member in 1994-95 considerably helped to widen the horizons of the new state. Czech troops went to Croatia and took part in the IFOR operation in Bosnia after 1995 (Žumár, November, 1997). In the capacity of membership on the Security Council, the Czechs also took a special interest in helping to resolve conflicts in Georgia, Iraq, and Rwanda. Following service on the Security Council, the Czechs became members of the UN's Economic and Social Council. During this service, they spotlighted the significance of humanitarian operations in the former Yugoslavia. Czechs were also

proud to be the first nation from the region to become a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In that capacity, they assisted in the closing of the GATT Uruguay round of trade negotiations and helped pave the way to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Economic activity also included the opening of the Czech Administrative Center in 1993. This center helped open doors for Czech enterprises and banks in numerous third world countries. In sum, the strategy in the 1993-96 period involved an initial outreach to more stable developed countries and a subsequent series of moves to assist both more problematic countries in the region like Romania and less developed nations in the third world. There would be a corresponding need to de-emphasize internal political struggles in order to focus more firmly on the new foreign policy challenges and responsibilities (Had, March, 1993).

In the last four years of the twentieth century, Czech foreign policy thinking became more multi-dimensional. As the EU began to develop the concept of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Czechs began to imagine what their role in it might be. What new functions, decision-making mechanisms, and financial obligations would accompany membership in such an organization (Šedivý, October, 1996)? Attention to the Western European Union (WEU) also increased with the holding of the Birmingham Summit of May 1996 and the Berlin Summit of June 1996. Both meetings envisioned an important role for the WEU in the overall European Security architecture. It remained to delineate the precise connections among WEU, NATO, and EU. In a sense, the increased interest in the EU accompanied a growing awareness that European security depended on more than merely defense and military considerations. It also involved economic and humanitarian issues (Eichler, March, 1997). In the midst of

those questions, of course, was the central need to defend Czech interests in all negotiations with the EU (Křiž, 1998).

In 1997 Czech foreign policy became even more multi-pronged. They received admission to the Council of Europe and also became much more active with the Council (later Organization) for Security and Cooperation Europe (CSCE, later OSCE). By 1998 the Czech Republic had become the Coordinator of Roma relations within the OSCE Secretariat. During the next year they became involved in OSCE activities in Bosnia, Chechnya, Georgia, Croatia, Kosovo, and Nagorno-Karabakh (Matějka, January, 2000). All of the new and prospective organizational commitments led the Foreign Ministry to begin to think about how to conceptualize a schema that both related their activities and promoted Czech interests. Simultaneous involvement in NATO, EU, OSCE, WEU, UN, WTO, and Council of Europe required a more complicated foreign policy than the old bilateralism (Šedivý, January, 1998).

By 1999 many of the theoretical concerns had yielded to concrete realities and considerations. In the spring the Czech Republic actually joined NATO, along with Poland and Hungary. Membership entailed immediately new considerations about defense legislation, the structure of military forces, preparation of personnel, security of air space, construction of a system of command and control, crisis management plans, standardization of weapons, and protection of intelligence. There would also be a need for civilian emergency planning (Svěrák, February, 1999). The entire Czech defense system required overhaul in order to mesh with NATO procedures and norms. In the spring the Balkans also required attention due to the NATO operation in Kosovo. To that mission the Czechs contributed field hospitals, unarmed planes, and the granting of

transit rights for planes flying combat missions (Kotyk, January, 2000). This operation also intensified discussion of the need for a Eurocorps or Rapid Reaction Force (Politika v České republice, March, 1999). At that time, however, it was assumed that Czech interests would be best served by strengthening its links to the WEU, in preparation for joining the EU (Politika v České republice, April, 1999).

By the year 2000 Czech leaders had decided to develop certain defense capabilities to buttress their contributions to European security missions. They included an independent mechanized battalion, a company of special forces, a helicopter swarm, a field hospital, and a chemical defense company (Politika v České republice, January, 2000). These would all be ready for action by 2003-04. By that year the nation would also be prepared to contribute soldiers to the Rapid Reaction Force. In fact, the Czechs made a specific offer of 1000 soldiers to that Force (Politika v České republice, June, 2000). Later in the year the process accelerated during the December Nice Summit. Following that Summit, the four Visegrad Presidents met in Szczeszin, Poland. They agreed to accept the conclusions of the Nice Summit about broadened cooperation and the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (Politika v České republice, January, 2001).

In sum, in the short space of eight years, the Czech leadership had moved quite a distance from initial doubts about the significance of the shrunken country in Europe and the early debates about any organizational involvement. By 2001 the nation was experienced in OSCE, OECD, and UN Security Council activities. They were also a full NATO member, had participated in a limited way in the Kosovo mission, and were well on the way to membership in the EU and its evolving defense obligations.

Czech Political Parties and Foreign Policy

It is important to look at the main principals of the key political parties in order to comprehend better the nature of the internal debate over foreign policy. This debate, when coupled with examination of election outcomes, can help explain periods of stasis and change on some of the significant foreign policy questions outlined in the previous section.

The Klaus Era (1993-97) was one in which the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) was the principal force in the government, with its leader Václav Klaus as Prime Minister. In general, the Klaus government favored all of the steps connected with the return to Europe. The break-up of the Czechoslovak state put the Ukraine and Russia further away geographically from the Czech Republic. Thus, the Czechs as early as 1994 joined the P4P, and stressed closer links to Poland. In one sense security was somewhat greater after 1993 because there were no longer any hostile border states (Szayna, 1999). However, the Social Democratic Party (CSSD) in opposition reacted against this unidirectional movement towards Western Europe. They preferred reliance on traditional ties to the other three Visegrad countries in the immediate neighborhood. Those other three, in addition to the Czech Republic, included Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary. During the 1997-98 period, in which the caretaker government under former Finance Minister Josef Tosovský served in the leadership capacity, the views of the ODS began to shift. With the elections scheduled for 1998, Klaus and the ODS began to reflect popular interest in protecting Czech interests during the movement into NATO and the EU. For example, they favored a referendum prior to EU entry during the election campaign itself. They also did not want to make concessions during the EU entry process on vital issues

flowing out of the consequences of World War II. For instance, they did not want to yield to German pressure to cancel the Beneš decrees that had resulted in the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia right after the end of that war (Mareš, January, 1999).

Analysis of political party positions during the 1998 elections is very revealing in terms of the issues and debates that circulated throughout the Czech Republic in the years that followed the election. The CSSD ended up technically in power, with Miloš Zeman as Prime Minister, but they lacked a legislative majority. A "Gentlemen's Agreement" with the ODS was necessary in order for that government to survive. Very quickly four smaller parties formed a "Four Party Coalition" to register even a third point of view. The Communist Party was vigorous and quite unreformed in its views. Thus, there was the possibility for a rich and at times acrimonious debate over foreign policy. This was especially true in light of the paramount importance of membership in both NATO and the EU for the Czech nation.

For the CSSD there was less emphasis on hardheaded defense of national interests and more of a focus on living standards and rights of citizens within the country. This link to public opinion led them to endorse the idea of a referendum prior to entry into either the EU or NATO. Czech sovereignty loomed more significant for them than extension of Czech national interests into the region. There also was a humanitarian component to their view of Czech relations with the outside world. Such a focus led them to upgrade the importance of North-South relations and a role for the UN. The Czechs should have a say when human rights were jeopardized in any part of the world. While they endorsed EU membership, they thought of it in terms of sparking the Czech

economy. While they favored NATO entry, they expressed grave concerns about future location of nuclear weapons on Czech territory. They were also quite sensitive to Russian concerns about expansion east of the military alliance. For the CSSD the WEU and OSCE were very important, and the immediate neighborhood, including Slovakia, should not be ignored (Durr, 2000).

During the 1998 election, the ODS gave a somewhat more realpolitik cast to its statements on foreign policy. National interests rather than humanitarian concerns were the top priority. NATO membership could bring increased security for the nation as well as trade and technological benefits. The latter would promote development of the free market, a priority for Klaus since the early 1990s. National economic interests were of paramount importance, while crusades connected with globalization and human rights were to be carefully examined. Increased Czech exports through membership in international organizations were the desired outcome. Thus, the party said less about broader international organizations that could pull the Czech nation beyond the orbit of its national interests (Durr, 2000).

Some of the smaller political parties also had clear and at times strong views on foreign policy in the 1998 election campaign. Expectedly, the Communist Party (KSČM) possessed very definite ideas about the foreign policy questions of the day. They rejected the idea of entry into NATO, for membership in the alliance would lead to domination by the United States and Germany, would be expensive, would limit national sovereignty, and would result in a de-emphasis on traditional ties to the East. They did favor EU entry, but such a move needed to be coupled with an emphasis on equity and the use of a referendum. The Christian Democratic Union-Czech People's Party (KDU-CSL) favored

both entry into NATO and membership in the EU, but they suggested creation of a new organization that would link those two organizations, the WEU, the UN, and the OSCE. The Freedom Union (US) had a particular interest in anchoring new organizational memberships in public opinion. For them, promotion of foreign policy discussions at the regional and local level was an important objective. In that sense, the Europe of the Regions within the EU was quite attractive. On the extreme right the Republicans possessed quite negative views about the strengthening tie to Germany. From their perspective, it would be better to spend money on education and health care than it would be to spend on increased defense projects. They were also very critical on the use of the Sudeten German issue by Germany as a potential device for rejecting Czech entry into either of the two organizations (Durr, 2000). While the principal debate took place between the CSSD and the ODS, the attitudes of these smaller parties helps to broaden the range of concerns expressed within the nation on the main foreign policy issues of the election campaign.

Following the election and the advent to power of the CSSD, foreign policy questions continued to increase in importance. NATO membership for the Czech Republic became a reality in 1999, and the Gotenburg Summit of 2001 resulted in a fairly firm commitment of EU membership by 2003. The Zeman government ironed out the technical details connected with entry into NATO and made important contributions to the NATO mission in Kosovo in 1999. They were able to firm up ties with Slovakia, a longstanding plank in their platform, for reasons that lie outside the Czech state. The Slovak nationalist leader Vladimír Mečiar fell from power and Miloš Dzurinda replaced him as Prime Minister. This made fruitful discussions between the two nations much

more likely. In particular, they anticipated progress on the critical issue of division of former federal property, and the two nations signed a compromise document on that issue on November 24, 1999. As expected, the CSSR sought to upgrade the Czech role in the OSCE. In addition to concern about individual rights, Zeman also expressed the hope to utilize that organization in the service of minority rights. There was also limited progress with Germany on the issue of the Beneš Decrees and the Sudeten Germans. Zeman conceded that the Beneš Decrees no longer applied in October, 1999, and the Germans promised that relations between the two states would no longer be hung up on the past (Kotyk, January, 2000). In power the CSSD was able to promote some of its longstanding goals, but on other issues its leader had to incorporate perspectives of the smaller parties as well. This no doubt was necessary due to the closeness of the election and the narrowness of the Zeman mandate.

Some of the key foreign policy events of the 1999-2001 period led to heated arguments among some of the political parties. For instance, the CSSD had to deal on a nearly continuous basis with protestors against the operation of the Temelin nuclear reactor. The Communist Party pushed them with some force on that issue. At the same time, the ODS expressed often the interests of exile groups and took up the rallying cry of working to obtain for them dual citizenship rights (Politika v České republice, January, 1999). Czech participation in the Kosovo bombing also resulted in vigorous debates. Some within the CSSD criticized the party's endorsement of the mission. The Communist Party organized a demonstration in Prague against the NATO action, while the Freedom Union proclaimed that the bombing campaign violated international law (Politika v České republice, February, 1999). In early 2001 the temporary incarceration

of two Czech citizens by the Castro regime in Cuba brought strong party views to the surface, especially from the smaller parties. For example, the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) was critical of Cuba but also argued that the Czech Republic should put distance between itself and those wanting to continue the sanctions against Cuba. The Republicans complained about the amount of money that was being spent on diplomatic missions to free Pilip and Bubeník. The Communist Party was more critical of the two Czechs caught in Cuba and worried about future damage to Czech-Cuban relations. Finally, some of the smaller parties in Moravia (MDS) and Silesia/Moravia (HSMS) began to see the Europe of the Regions of the EU as a vehicle for enhancing their own national rights with the Czech state (Politika v České republice, January, 2001). They, however, are small parties with a limited influence.

Attention to the views of the political parties enriches understandings of the Czech point of view on the major foreign policy questions of the day. While movement towards NATO and the EU may have been an inexorable one in the decade after 1993, the shifts and nuances of policy can often be linked to political party debates and election outcomes. Czech foreign policy is, therefore, in inextricable part of its new democratic ethos.

Role of the Western European Union (WEU)

The Western European Union has figured into many of the discussions about the role of the Central European nations in a common defense and foreign policy. On the one hand, it offers the prospect of a third way of meshing capabilities and thus is additional to the EU and NATO. On the other hand, the WEU has added to the confusion

about the lines of demarcation among the three separate organizations. In a sense, participation in the WEU was attractive to the Czech Republic before the momentum for the CFSP of the EU began to build. By the turn of the century, the WEU was declining in importance as the CFSP became more significant in European calculations.

Creation of the WEU occurred in 1948 with the signing of the Brussels Treaty. However, in the following year NATO placed the WEU under its jurisdictional umbrella (Bednář, 1999). The WEU emerged with some significance in the 1950s after the collapse of the European Defense Community (EDC). Suspicion about West German participation in the EDC had led to its defeat, and thus the WEU became a tool in the early Cold War for factoring in both West Germany and Italy to European defense planning. However, the entry of the United Kingdom into the EU in 1973 began the process of the organization’s decline. In 1984 the Rome Declaration underlined the importance of the WEU in an effort to bring it back to life (Nikodém, 1999). Several years later the WEU made some contributions to the UN victory in the Persian Gulf War (Bednář, 1999). While the WEU could have possessed equally strong ties to the EU and to NATO, poor communications between the EU and WEU in the early 1990s led to the stronger tie between NATO and WDU (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999).

By 1994 the WEU was of significance to the integrating efforts of both the EU and NATO. The Maastricht Accord of 1991 imputed to the WEU a role in promoting the process of European integration in a way that would assist Europe in taking responsibility for its own affairs. It was with the development of the agreements at Maastricht that the WEU for the first time was assigned a tangible role (Emerson, 1998). Following Maastricht, the WEU invited other EU and NATO nations to join (Bednář, 1999). At the

same time, many hoped that the WEU would create a platform for political consensus within NATO and also concrete support for the functional unity of NATO (Pezl, May, 1994). During the following year, 1992, the important Petersburg Declaration was passed. That Declaration set up a WEU Planning Cell and also alerted members to the need to make military units available. Many hoped that the WEU could be the European "pillar" of NATO as well as the military organization of the EU (Bednář, 1999). As late as 1996-97 there were expectations that the WEU would be an appropriate tool for providing force in support of defensive operations, humanitarian missions, and peace operations. There was even talk of expansion of the membership of the organization (Khol, April, 2000).

However, declining interest in the organization soon set in. Central European states took more of an interest in joining the EU and NATO than they did in hooking up with the WEU. If the WEU took action in a crisis, it would be able to borrow NATO resources and also look to the EU for leadership. In fact, the Brussels Summit of 1994 had endeavored to link the three organizations by suggesting that NATO could make its assets available to the WEU in carrying out missions of the CFSP. The theory was that NATO assets were "separable" from the organization but not "separate" (Bednář, 1999). This formula turned out to be nearly unworkable. In reality, no one expected much from the WEU given the growing importance of the other two organizations (Khol, April, 2000).

In spite of the doubts, the WEU continued to be part of discussions that involved the Central European states. In October 2000 the Czech Republic joined the WEU's armament group (WEAG). It was hoped that this step would enable the nation's defense

industry to compete on an equal basis with other European arms producers (RFE, RL, October 31, 2000). Based on the Cologne European Council of June, 1999, these states could also take part in WEU Council meetings, but they could not block decisions made by a consensus of the regular members (Šedivý, 1999). Further, the states could participate in planning WEU operations that utilized NATO assets as well as the WEU Satellite Center. Many of these efforts came together in May, 1998, a year in which the WEU and NATO worked out the details of future consultation. The resulting framework document included common terminology for managing crises, a common defense planning process, and joint meetings of the General Secretaries of the two organizations (Khol, March, 2000).

However, these plans to incorporate the WEU into the complicated defense planning process for the future in Europe encountered obstacles that drained away the power, meaning, and role of the organization. While the British worried about alienating the United States, the French were anxious about sparking an increase in American influence (Khol, March, 2000). Shifts in the balance of power within NATO could be highly destabilizing at a sensitive time that involved coordination of the SFOR mission in Bosnia and preparations for the Kosovo operation. Gradually, discussions about European defense centered more and more on the CFSP of the EU and on NATO. The WEU began to disappear from the horizon.

Development of the CFSP

During the early years of EU activity, the main thrusts of activity centered on economic, political, diplomatic, and trade activities. There was no emphasis at all on

defense matters. However, in the decade of the 1990s the EU began to plan for a military component and functions as well. Therefore, they created the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1990, a year that followed the revolutionary events of anti-communist victories in Central Europe. However, the newly created machinery was unable to play any role in the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and did little during the disintegration of Yugoslavia (Khol, April, 2000). A second step in the process of developing defense muscle power for the EU occurred in 1993 with the Treaty of Europe. This Treaty resulted in the addition of permanent officials from the EU Council Secretariat as well as 15 diplomats from each Foreign Ministry to the CFSP. Further, the CFSP was firmly linked to the Presidency (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999).

Following the institutional reforms demanded by the Treaty of Europe, the EU set concrete policy objectives for the CFSP. They included promotion of democratic processes in Central Europe, furtherance of the peace process in the Middle East, assistance to democratic development in South Africa, conflict resolution in Yugoslavia, and extension of democracy to Russia. Accomplishments within this framework included supervision of the 1996 Bosnian elections and financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority. However, it was one thing to declare policy and another to see that it was implemented. Such concerns led to changes in the central CFSP concept in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. Brussels took more control of policy formation and relied less on policy consultation among the member nations. In addition, the EU created a new Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit. At the same time, Amsterdam provided member

nations the right to veto CFSP missions if they contradicted national policy (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999). Veto or constructive abstention by one-third of the membership would kill the planned mission.

During the late 1990s the critics of the CFSP offered other suggestions and modifications. A number of observers thought that CFSP capabilities were too limited to back up the expansive objectives. Perhaps it would be better to have the organization focus on more realistic functions. Those might include mediation services, a role as regional pacifier, a mission as conflict mediator, and a bridge between rich and poor nations (Hill, 1998). There were also worries that the veto provision or constructive abstention feature of the Amsterdam Treaty would nullify application of any needed common foreign policy (Allen, 1998). Others contended that the original economic mission of the EU was becoming cloudy with the addition of defense and security provisions. From that vantage point, the CFSP should be on the margins of EU activity rather than in the center (Smith, 1998). Finally, many realists thought that there might be many potential conflicts between preservation of national interests and planned CFSP actions. The machinery of the CFSP was probably too cumbersome to respond effectively to crises, and the lack of agreement among members on basic values would always make agreement on policy difficult (Peterson and Sjursen, 1998).

In that light there were further efforts in early 2000 again to draw up a list of functions that the EU could reasonably expect the CFSP to accomplish. Fraser Cameron listed emergency humanitarian assistance through ECHO, rescue missions and searches, use of military and civilian police in difficult situations like Albania or Kosovo, mine-clearing, aid in the demilitarization process after the end of a war, monitor of human

rights and elections, assistance in the construction of an independent media and institutions, and arbitration services (Cameron, March, 2000).

Radek Khol (April, 2000) put an emphasis on needed organizational features. For example, he noted that the CFSP should be able by 2003 to provide the support of 60,000 military personnel in air and naval support during an emergency. There should be an emphasis on strengthening organizational capacities at the national, multi-national, and European levels. He hoped that the newly created Military Committee would be capable of providing useful military advice to the Political Security Committee as well as effective military orders to the Military Staff. In addition, this view entailed the call for creation of a communications channel to link these new organizations with one another and with pre-exiting ones as well. These kinds of organizational suggestions combine the call for changed functions to present a more realistic picture of the CFSP than the one that evolved through the Treaty process of the previous decade.

Impact of the CFSP on the Czech Republic

In early 2001 the Czech Foreign Minister (Kavan, January, 2001) made a persuasive case for the natural harmony between the objectives of the CFSP and the national interests of the Czech Republic. For him the current spirit of cooperation in Europe was a needed antidote to the suffering of the Czechoslovak nation during the twentieth century. The Czech Republic would gain both assistance in its multi-pronged process of development and also the opportunity to contribute to regional problem solving. He did not envision participation in European and Atlantic structures as a threat to Czech national interests. In particular, the December 2000 Nice Summit generated

organizational changes in EU institutions that would continue to break down the artificial barriers that divided Europe during the Cold War. Growing European strength would simultaneously contribute to an increase in Czech capabilities. States like the Czech Republic needed a respite from pressure by Brussels and looked forward to a pleasant, calming integration process after the summer 2001 Goteborg Summit (Telička, 2001).

In concrete terms the Czech Republic made certain commitments to the CFSP process through its National Program in the year 2000. The Program stated a readiness to adopt the CFSP Acquis. In the previous year the Czech Republic had increased the number of staff members working in the Department for Political Relations with the EU. These individuals had assigned responsibilities for CFSP issues within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Further, they created an Associated European Correspondent Unit to ensure open communication and dialogue with the EU (National Program, 2000). At that point the Czech Republic had already for one year been participating in the regular meetings of the CFSP and some of its associated structures (National Program, 1999). All of these activities combined with the positive attitude of foreign policy leaders to offer hope for both a smooth transition into and full participation in the CFSP processes and policies.

There were also efforts within the Czech Republic to address the complicated issue of relations between the existing WEU and the budding CFSP process. The Cologne European Council meeting in 1999 had called for merger between the EU and WEU by the end of 2000. WEU associated members like the Czech Republic had received substantial rights already within that organization. They only lacked the right individually to block a decision. Thus, as the WEU began the process of slow death as

early as 1999, the Czechs worried about possessing fewer rights within the CFSP. Since the CFSP was so new, its delineation of rights was fairly rudimentary. Czechs argued for bringing the entire WEU Acquis into the CFSP of the EU. They also wanted such incorporation to bring in the different statuses of nations that had characterized the WEU. Czechs would benefit from the latter step since they were now members of NATO. As such they could rely on NATO assets and capabilities even if NATO were not directly involved in a CFSP operation. There was no guarantee of the outcome of this issue, for France in particular was opposed. The French thought in terms of a pure EU operation without necessarily including the baggage of NATO and the WEU (Lunák and Šedivý). All these issues required careful negotiation with other EU members, and the outcome would be uncertain. In large part the dilemma was rooted in the very uncertain boundaries established among the WEU, NATO, and the CFSP.

Radek Khol, in an interview at the Ústav mezinárodných vztahů (February 5, 2001), confirmed that the WEU was in a “cryogenic” state. As the WEU shifted its functions to the EU, the six countries first on the list for EU membership would be the ones most affected. He also underlined the significance of bringing into the EU the four grades of membership that existed within the WEU. Those grades were the key to the process of moving up to the level of full membership. In his view, the Czechs realized that the process of developing the CFSP was “unstoppable,” but the leadership was very interested in preserving the trans-Atlantic tie through NATO. He thought it was particularly important that the EU and NATO develop more effective ways of talking to one another. Khol also injected a note of caution about potential Czech financial contributions to the new processes. The cost of being a new member in both NATO and

the EU would be very high, and the exchange rate had deteriorated in a significant way between 1997 and 2000. There would be a pressing need for the leadership to weigh options carefully as the question of committing Czech capabilities came up. At the same time, he did not expect the Czechs to utilize the veto very often. In sum, Czech participation in the CFSP would likely possess a thoughtful, measured, and positive flavor.

NATO and CFSP

NATO membership in 1999 brought new obligations for the Czech Republic. There was a need to prepare defense legislation and proposals in order to begin the process of meeting NATO standards. A need to address changed personnel requirements was also important. The military began to develop courses about the changing role of the military for all ranks in the military. Training in the use of radar was upgraded in importance. The Czech Republic would have to build a crisis command center that would facilitate the rapid sharing of information between NATO and the Czech Republic. Further, a new system of logistic security was a necessity. New organizations and structures for the military forces were a future need. In addition, the Czechs would have to build a system of command and control that paralleled the systems in other NATO nations. In fact, standardization across many areas of the military profession would become a pressure very soon. Besides the military component, there was also the important arena of non-military defense of the country. Moravia and northern Bohemia had already begun to erect structures for civilian emergency planning, but these efforts had to be expanded to the entire nation (Svěrák, February, 1999). All of these new

efforts after 1999 would demand much from a nation and people that was struggling with the dislocations that characterized the early post-communist era.

Immediately, NATO had an opportunity to use its expanded membership base to carry out the Kosovo operation in the spring of 1999. However, problems soon emerged, and a principal one was the asymmetry of the war. America provided eighty per cent of the bombs dropped on Kosovo as well as ninety per cent of the weapons. Further, Europeans had been unable to convince the NATO leadership to consider the use of ground troops in that theater of operations. In October 1999 at Strasburg, there was a lively discussion about the importance of Europe taking more responsibility in future crises. In particular, there was a need for action in the economic, political, and humanitarian areas (Pick, 2000).

A number of related issues emerged at about the same time. Czechs, like other Europeans, began to worry about the prospect of a new round of American isolationism. Both the Bush presidential campaign and the doubts of some American Senators about continuing to support the 1972 nuclear agreement on limiting ABM sites accentuated European concerns. Increasingly, European leaders such as French President Jacques Chirac noted the significance of strengthening the partnership between NATO and the EU. However, there were six NATO nations that were not EU members. They included Iceland, Turkey, Norway, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. For the Czech Republic, there would be a certain awkwardness if defense operations were in the future based more and more in EU structures such as the CFSP. Creation of special channels of communication between their country and the EU on defense matters would be a task for the immediate future (Pick, 2000). In general, as a result of all these post-Kosovo

considerations, discussions centered increasingly on the establishment of formal links between NATO structures and EU forms such as the CFSP. There would be a need for a careful balancing of considerations and capabilities. While the EU leadership began to think in a systematic way about taking concrete steps to strengthen its own defense, it also had to weigh in its equally strong desire to preserve the Atlantic tie through NATO to the US.

Other analysts began to explore the conceptual territory of future links between the two primarily European regional organizations. Gow (1999) envisioned a future in which NATO focused on purely security matters while the CFSP developed "values, practices and institutions of a security policy culture to underpin a more stable security environment." The latter emphasis on values clearly had more to do with the European concern about Yugoslavia than did NATO with its more traditional, security orientation. Another writer (Sjursen, 1999) similarly described the CFSP as "Europeanization with shared norms and rules." Increased activity by the EU in foreign policy could also lead to increased tension within the organization. Nations would feel at times a conflict between their new participation in a common foreign policy and the traditional desire to control their own national foreign policies. Addition of more states to the EU would multiply the probability of fracturing the organization on security questions. Thus, development of a common base of foreign policy values within the CFSP would be no easy matter. There were also risks that some Central European nations would value NATO admission more than they would EU admission (Smith, 1999). This possibility existed because of their own border problems and their corresponding need to be part of a proven security organization rather than one that was just developing an identity.

Czech leaders were particularly interested in playing a role in this evolving European security structure during the interval between their admission to NATO and their membership access to the EU. Therefore, they saw the usage of NATO assets and capabilities as a key ingredient in any future EU operations. For instance, the EU might rally nations behind a new operation. Non-EU, NATO members might want to join in that operation. In order to do so in a way that made a contribution, they would need equal access to NATO assets and capabilities with the full EU members. Since the CFSP would not for some time have adequate capabilities to resolve such crises, use of NATO resources would be imperative (Lunak and Šedivý, 1999). For example, by early in the year 2000, European military expenditures were only sixty per cent of those of the United States, while European spending in the research area was only thirty per cent of the comparable figures for America (Khol, 2000). Radek Khol, among others, began to think ahead to the specific areas of defense activity that Europeans needed to upgrade. It was vital that the European defense resources not duplicate American capabilities but be based on features that could protect Europe from North Africa to the Baltic Republics. EU defense planners should narrow the gap with the United States in the specific areas of strategic preparations, logistics, satellite communications, and research. Attention to planning, budget, and program was also required. Finally, EU defense architects would need to anchor their military structures on the principal of flexibility in light of new types of missions. The old anchor of traditional national defense would decline in significance. It was probably the case that the stronger EU nations would have to lead the way in this transformation (Khol, 2000). The Czech Republic would move in those directions but at a more measured pace.

All of these considerations about the CFSP came together at the EU's Nice Summit in December, 2000. The leaders confirmed that there would be a Rapid Reaction Force by the year 2003. Such a force would enable Europeans to take action by themselves against rogue states or in the eventuality of a future Bosnia or Kosovo on the fringes of their own region. The limited participation of France in NATO and Turkey's absence from the EU would create certain obstacles, but those would depend in part on the location of the crisis. While the United States would not take part in these types of missions, there would be a need to assure that it would share its vast information resources with the CFSP operation in the anticipated crises (Buric, January 5, 2001).

Conclusion

Clearly, the development of the CFSP and eventual Czech participation in it was a natural step in the post-Cold War development of European security. NATO existed for four decades as a bulwark against the communist empire to the east. Many expected NATO to disappear along with the Warsaw Treaty Organization in the early 1990s. However, it did not. Instead, extension of membership to new states to the East became big business. As NATO expanded, the logic of American leadership on all security dilemmas in Europe began to weaken. The simultaneous expansion of the EU in the same Central European region awakened similar desires for using EU structures alone in security crises. From that vantage point, the growing conversation about the CFSP makes enormous sense. It remains to consider the potential role for that new EU capability in the transformation of European defense architecture.

In the political arena, superpower competition between the United States and Soviet Union yielded to conflict among some of the world's great civilizations. Conflict was particularly likely in small countries that included several of those civilizations living in close quarters. Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia are clear-cut examples. The CFSP would be more flexible than NATO to deal with future conflicts of that nature. In addition, nations would be taking police actions in their own neighborhoods, a step that many international relations theorists have been calling for for some time. During the Cold War the nuclear risk primarily involved the nuclear standoff between the two superpowers. In the post-Cold War concerns centered on numerous internal conflicts that might invite the threat of wider war that could bring in the nuclear powers or nations that had been secretly developing a small-scale nuclear capability. Again, the CFSP with its proximity to such conflicts and civil wars could offer purely European services and concepts for defusing issues before they moved to a higher level (Kříž, 1998).

Much of western thinking about security issues has entailed a debate between realists and idealists. When realists call for the primacy of state security, idealists respond with equal vigor for the importance of the rights of peoples. While realists consider the military aggression of states to be the principal threat to security, idealists are much more likely to look at the breaking of international law codes as the highest risk. In order to cope with the defined risks, realists call for expansion of military power and idealists look to protection of international rights (Křiž, 1998). The CFSP could reinforce either of those two schools of thought. However, it could help in moving the dialogue beyond two schools of thought that flared so brightly during the Cold War.

Since the CFSP is part of the EU, it would be ideally situated to comprehend the economic and social basis behind many conflicts. Further, it might be able to emphasize the significance of protecting the security of individuals in addition to national security and the security of peoples. Finally, the CFSP may rely more heavily on political tools to solve regional conflicts that are fraught with economic and social threats to the sanctity of the individual.

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