

American National Security Policy after September 11

The tragic events connected with the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center transformed America's approach to national security policy. The impact was immediate and sharply focused on three critical security areas: objectives, bureaucracies, and policies. First, objectives of security policy expanded to include the manifold challenges that the al Qaeda terrorist network presented. Second, the traditional national security bureaucracies moved again into the center of the stage under an even brighter spotlight, while proposals for new bureaucratic units emerged in short order. Third, policy changes included both an international effort to cultivate new allies and a domestic campaign to balance civil liberties with more complete protection of individual citizens. In all three of these areas, new footprints were visible on the first anniversary of the September 11 events.

In fact, this transformation was the second upheaval in a period of time that spanned barely more than a decade. The East European Revolutions of 1989 as well as the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 changed profoundly each of these three key components of security policy. With the collapse of the communist systems and the emergence of the so-called Post-Cold War Period, there was a corresponding need to uncover a new set of objectives to replace the general containment approach of the Cold War. At the same time, national security bureaucracies that had been riveted on restriction of communist power acquired new functions more appropriate to the multiplicity of new threats. Further, new policy concerns connected with instability in the post-communist systems replaced old worries about the spread of communism, while previously ignored regions and problems received the fresh attention of policy-makers. This set of related changes in the 1990s had certainly not jelled into any sort of pattern at the time when new threats and challenges emerged in the fall of 2001.

In this essay each of the three components of national security will receive attention. In order to understand more clearly the impact of September 11, it will be important to view each of the three security areas through the lenses of Cold War, post-Cold War, and post-September 11 dynamics. Then the nature of recent challenges to the American security system will be more evident. In a sense, those challenges are more pervasive given that they really entail a double transformation in such a short space of time. It would be a mistake to conceptualize the four decades of Cold War as a time of total stability in the American national security process. However, the parameters of objectives, bureaucracies, and policies were relatively visible and constant. American citizens could be clear on both the nature of the enemy and the basic requisites for the United States. Following the anti-communist revolutions of 1989-91 and the al Qaeda attacks of 2001, that clarity gave way to a mix of confusion and perpetual anxiety. For political leaders the new challenge lay in the realm of radically changing the national security system in ways that both dissipated the fog of confusion and allayed citizen anxiety.

REDEFINING OBJECTIVES

During the Cold War defining objectives did not entail a lengthy process. There was an immediate necessity to come to terms with a newly expansionist Soviet foreign policy under Stalin. Specifically, President Truman utilized the concept of containment, a term suggested by George Kennan in a famous cable to Washington from Moscow in 1946, in order to justify assistance in 1947 to non-communist forces battling in Greece and Turkey. There was assumption that such assistance would halt Soviet-inspired aggression and might even weaken the capabilities of the Soviet Union. The roll call of places in which American leaders applied containment has a familiar sound to careful observers of the foreign policy process. They include the Marshall Plan for Europe in 1948, involvement in the Korean War in the early 1950s, imposition of a blockade around Cuba after Soviet efforts to install nuclear weapons in 1962, the major commitment to anti-communist allies in Vietnam/Cambodia in the 1964-73 period, and lesser concerns such as Guatemala in 1954, Hungary in 1956, the Dominican Republic in 1965, and Czechoslovakia in 1968. The final years of the Cold War in the 1980s displayed a serious, persistent American response to the Soviet crack-down on Poland in 1981 and the variety of communist challenges in Central America during the Reagan Administration (1981-89). Central to all those commitments was the assumption that the injection of American military and diplomatic power would both contain and erode Soviet influence.

With the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War, containment could no longer provide a clear list of objectives. Several presidential administrations attempted to come up with a replacement more suitable to the new kinds of challenges in the post-Cold War world. At the time of the Persian Gulf War (1990-91), the Bush Administration (1989-93) promoted the objective of utilizing American power to bring about a New World Order. Clearly, that concept addressed a world in which the American military was the strongest and most effective in the international political arena. With the decline of the Soviet military and the break-up of the Soviet Union, policing operations led by the American military would be needed. At the same time, The Bush Administration assumed that other strong leaders like Saddam Hussein might endanger surrounding states. Perhaps a new mission for the American military might be constructing coalitions to restrict such leaders and to push them back when they became too aggressive. However, the concept of New World Order never became an effective substitute for containment, because after 1991 there were no obvious duplicates of the Persian Gulf situation. Serbian aggression into Croatia and Bosnia bore a surface similarity, but the ethnic complexity and lack of an economic stake made a firm American response unlikely.

The Clinton Administration (1993-2001) at times utilized Engagement and Enlargement as a unifying foreign policy concept that was pointed in the direction of objective setting. In the view of National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, the main American foreign policy objective entailed engagement with nations that both nurtured growth of a market economy and protected human rights. Further, it was in America's interest to enlarge the universe of nations that committed themselves to that double purpose. In general, this concept helps to explain a number of steps taken by the United States in the 1990s. The United States reached out to a number of post-communist states that were making an effort to set up capitalist systems as well as to protect human rights.

Examples included the admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO in 1999. Those three former communist nations had made the most progress in terms of the criteria of Engagement and Enlargement. Such achievements made their potential contribution to NATO promising. Another example included the NATO bombing mission in Kosovo in 1999. Protection of the human rights of the Muslims against Serbian aggression was the rationale. Delay in granting Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) as well as World Trade Organization (WTO) membership to China was another set of decisions that fit the pattern. Continued isolation of Cuba was part of this overall approach as well. However, while Engagement and Enlargement offers a plausible explanation of application of American values to certain challenges of the 1990s, it never caught on in the public imagination in the way that containment had in earlier decades.

In the mist of uncertainty that hung over the definition of American national security objectives, the attack on September 11 blasted forth like a bolt of lightning. Certainly, the attack pulled the attention of policy-makers away from the heavy focus of the 1990s on the post-communist region, in particular the Balkans. Once again, the area of the world in which Islam plays such a central role became the center of attention. The ensuing deep military involvement of the United States and its allies raised anew the question of objectives.

In a sense, the redefined objectives of the post-Cold War played a role in the new mission to root out al Qaeda. Just as the concept of New World Order placed heavy reliance on the United States to take the critical leadership role in developing collective security networks against aggression, so the attack on the Twin Towers placed the United States into the critical leading role. Engagement and Enlargement involved in part the attention of policy-makers to human rights violations, and the heavy loss of innocent life during the morning of September 11 included violation of those values on a massive scale. However, other components came to the surface as well. While anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism had been key parts of American strategy, the attacks elevated their importance in a marked way. The main emphasis, of course, was on the uprooting of Taliban control over Afghanistan as well as on the eradication of al Qaeda networks within that country. However, given the porous nature of the borders of Afghanistan, the search for terrorism would inevitably involve offensives in many surrounding countries. Further, the concern with the prospect that nuclear weapons would fall into the hands of terrorist groups created much more apprehension. The Bush reference to the Axis of Evil in his State of the Union Address in January 2002 created controversy. However, it also elevated in importance that longstanding problem by linking it to other major challenges. In conclusion, a new mix of objectives that included a central American role, human rights, anti- and counter-terrorism, and containment of nuclear “rogue” states emerged. The September 11 attack had the ultimate impact of linking all four components together. Integration of them into a cohesive, rational set of objectives remained a challenge for the future. The challenge was even greater in light of America’s traditional inability to comprehend international actors whose motivations and actions were basically irrational.

RESHAPING BUREAUCRACIES

National security bureaucratic organizations during the Cold War were focused on containing the communist threat. In the early decades after the end of World War II, the State Department emerged as both a key definer of the threat and a key shaper of the response. A number of Secretaries of State played critical roles in that process. For example, George Marshall outlined a strategy for rebuilding Western Europe in order to make it a bulwark of strength that could deter as well as repel Soviet-led aggression further west. In the early 1950s Dean Acheson defined American national interests in the new arena of Asia and the Pacific. The concern was to prevent a repetition in Asia of the communist takeovers in Eastern Europe in the late 1940s. The bellicosity of the North Korean regime combined with the fall of China to communism to accentuate the danger. In the 1950s John Foster Dulles utilized strident rhetoric to under-gird his ideological campaign against the evils of communism. During these decades the State Department itself was decentralized into units that corresponded to sectors of the world in which the key threats emerged. Foreign Service Officers developed specialties that enabled them to provide back-up for the strategies being developed at the top.

The new consolidated Department of Defense was an important resource in the key battles against the communist threat. Individual secretaries left a major imprint on policy. Robert McNamara in the 1960s was a key architect of the campaign in Southeast Asia, but he also sought to transform the role of the Pentagon in the policy process with an eye on a more rational planning model. This program was entitled Planned Policy Budgeting System (PPBS), an approach that required that each military service develop only capabilities that served clearly defined objectives. In the early 1980s Casper Weinberger authored a doctrine that constituted an effort to set guidelines in the post-Vietnam era. His criteria included, among others, the requirement that public support exist prior to the dispatch of troops to a foreign conflict and that policy-makers clearly define objectives at the outset. In turn, the Department of Defense underwent numerous changes. Inclusion of a separate Air Force in the 1947 reorganization plan became critical at the end of the century with the emergence of conflicts in which air power became the key ingredient to success. The Pentagon and its four military services became an important part of the political process as well. The experience in Vietnam and the later involvement in 1983 in Grenada brought political rivalries among the various services to the surface. The various services also developed significant links with defense contractors and congressmen on the committees responsible for oversight of the defense process. Political leaders and critics complained often about these “iron triangles” of power but also stood in awe of their clout.

Bureaucratic restructuring in the aftermath of World War II also included creation of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Council (NSC). In the first three decades of its existence the CIA was unchallenged by other bureaucratic players in both defining the threat to the United States and collecting information about it. The influence of Director Allen Dulles in the 1950s and early 1960s was such that his plan for liberating Cuba from communist control in 1961 went unchallenged by others within the Kennedy Administration. The organization itself focused heavily on clandestine operations that resulted in acquisition of important information about threats in important conflict areas of the world. Equally important was the analytical unit, based in Washington, D.C., that bore the responsibility for putting incoming information from the

field into a mosaic that was useful for the actual policy-makers. Media exposure of the role of the CIA in plans to overthrow leaders in Vietnam, Cuba, Chile, and elsewhere led to public discontent with the organization in the mid-1970s. More restrictive congressional oversight and establishment of House and Senate Intelligence Oversight Committees were the inevitable consequences.

The National Security Council (NSC) and its Advisor were relatively quiet bureaucratic players in the policy process in the early Cold War. Their joint responsibility was analysis of policy options on arising national security problems. Supervision of policy implementation was a secondary assignment. With the appointment in 1969 of Henry Kissinger as NSC Advisor, this apparatus moved to center stage. In many regards, particularly the opening to China as well as arms diplomacy with the Soviet Union, the Advisor seemed to be a key policy-maker as well as spokesperson. This pattern continued on a less dramatic scale with the appointment of Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1979. Partly due to his personal background as a refugee from Poland, he ended up having a major impact on policy towards the communist bloc. Interestingly, in the mid-1980s the NSC process experienced public and congressional challenges whose intensity paralleled the criticism of the CIA a decade earlier. Involvement of NSC official Oliver North in the Iran-Contra escapade raised the ire of a number of concerned public and organizational players. As a result, the NSC/Advisor made a hasty retreat to its original mission of being primarily an ombudsman of policy options for the President.

In sum, the Cold War was a time of the birth of two new organizations in the area of national security policy, the CIA and NSC/Advisor. Both experienced seasons of major bureaucratic influence but also times of questioning and retrenchment. The two traditional Departments, State and Defense, were consistently in the middle of the policy process during the first four decades after the end of the Cold War. However, the Secretaries who headed them varied considerably both in their individual prominence and in their impact on the policy process.

Some bureaucratic adaptation took place in the immediate post-Cold War period (1989-2001). All of the organizations de-emphasized plans and personnel whose major focus was on the communist/post-communist geographic space. In turn, they shifted gears and put the spotlight on regions that were battlegrounds of the new conflicts. Leaders of all the organizations made efforts to realign capabilities in support of future missions that were tied to changing policy objectives.

The three Secretaries of State in the period came from strikingly different backgrounds. James Baker, III, had been a major political advisor and campaign strategist for President Bush. He brought considerable skills to the position and ended up devoting enormous energy in particular to the Middle East. The Persian Gulf War of 1990-91 had underlined the centrality of oil to the stability of the American economy and political system. In the first Clinton Term (1993-97) Warren Christopher applied his long background in the State Department to the top position. While he had played an important mediating role in the release of American hostages in Iran in 1981, he maintained a very formal, low-key profile in the 1990s. His successor, Madeleine Albright, injected flair and personality into the policy process during the second Clinton Term. Her background somewhat paralleled that of Brzezinski, for her family had fled Czechoslovakia after the 1948 communist coup. She was bold enough to stand up to Balkan leaders who were resistant to agreements of NATO and the UN about the peace

process in the region. Recruitment to the State Department centered on specialists in areas such as economics, technology, and political conditions in third world settings.

The Department of Defense experienced ups and downs as an organization during the decade after the end of the Cold War. Immediately after the celebration of the fall of communism, there was a need to mobilize military force in the Persian Gulf region. The organization performed differently in this conflict than in previous Cold War struggles for a number of reasons. For example, air power was the centerpiece of the wartime strategy because of the number of new technological developments. Since the war followed a decade of military build-up under President Reagan during the late Cold War period, capabilities were at a high water mark when the challenge from Saddam Hussein erupted in 1990 in the Gulf area. In addition, passage of the Goldwater-Nichols act in 1986 established new bureaucratic relationships during wartime operations. Specifically, the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) became an independent advisor to the President as well as the individual responsible for producing compromises among the Chiefs of each of the respective services themselves. Also, the Act empowered regional commanders to a greater extent than had earlier been the case. These organizational changes accounted for the prominence during the war of JCS Chair Colin Powell and Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Norman Schwartzkopf. The Central Command is the Joint Military Command responsible for Africa and the Middle East. However, the period following the Gulf War victory was one of decline in resources available to the military. With no major enemy on the horizon, public and Congress were unwilling to maintain the level of support that characterized Cold War times. The U.S. need to orchestrate a bombing campaign in 1999 in Kosovo may have been a reminder for the future of the costs of such inattention.

For the CIA and NSC the period of the 1990s was one in which they also needed to make adjustments to the new policy climate. In particular, the CIA emphasized somewhat newer transnational issues such as counter-narcotics, counter-intelligence, technology transfers, and counter-proliferation of nuclear material. A focus on economic problems and terrorism moved up the ladder of concern while the battle against communism for the most part ebbed. The NSC remained for the most part in a post-Iran-contra background. However, Anthony Lake in the first Clinton term played a major role in the effort to develop Engagement and Enlargement as a new strategy, while Sandy Berger in the second term became a forceful defender and advocate of policy.

Following the September 11 attack, leaders in all of these organizations were forced to rethink their role in the policy process. New bureaucratic players also emerged as a way of dealing with the grave new threat. While the traditional bureaucracies had normally focused on threats to security abroad, the shattering events of September pulled the attention of a number of these organizations as well to the threat within.

The military campaign against al Qaeda, like the Gulf War a decade earlier, threw the Pentagon into the middle of the policy process. Special Forces in particular played a critical role into the battle against the Taliban as well as in the cave-to-cave search for terrorists. Again, as in the Gulf War, air power was critical in the initial effort to break the back of the incumbent Taliban regime. However, the military was less prepared for this battle than it might have been a decade earlier due to post-Cold War cutbacks. The battle in Afghanistan and in other countries infected by al Qaeda also highlighted the need to transform military capabilities so that they would be more mobile and suited to

the continuing hunt for terrorists. In terms of personality, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld became a very strong policy advisor, leader of the military services, and public spokesperson for the Administration.

While the State Department as an organization did not play a central role in this battle, its secretary Colin Powell was a prominent advisor and public personality during the intense period of the crisis. Like Rumsfeld he traveled frequently to the area and held countless meetings with other individuals involved in the war. In the same fashion NSC Advisor Condoleezza Rice explained policy to the public while at the same time being a critical link in the advisory process. While some observers questioned CIA preparedness for the attack, Director George Tenet had his hands full mobilizing the agency to be part of the new campaigns. He also became a critical player in Israeli-Middle East negotiations. Further, Vice President Cheney clearly played a central leadership role that paralleled those of the others. In fact, the harmony within the bureaucratic team no doubt had something to do with the fact that Cheney, Powell, and Rumsfeld had also been major advisors during the Gulf War under the first President Bush.

In a number of respects, the portrait of organizational players underwent transformation and expansion in the year following the attack. Almost immediately, Tom Ridge moved from the Pennsylvania Governor's Mansion to a newly created position as Director of the White House Office of Homeland Security. Very quickly discussion centered on replacing private airport security companies hired by the airlines with federal employees whose incentives for rigorous scrutiny of passengers might be greater. The Airport Security Act eventually called for a transition to control by federal bureaucracies, after agreement by the Congress. Further, within the Department of Transportation policy planners created a new Transportation Security Administration to supervise both the federalization of airport security and the new federal employees. Its missions were to supervise airport screening, increase efforts for bomb detection, hire and train screeners, place air marshals on more flights, strengthen cockpit doors, and fortify procedures for passenger screening in order to spot potential terrorists. For the most part, these organizational innovations were directed at defense on the domestic front, and this constituted something relatively new in the national security equation.

Controversy developed over a number of aspects of the rapidly emerging but somewhat haphazard plan. Critics pointed out that Director Ridge suffered from a vague job definition and lack of Cabinet rank. Others observed that many existing agencies contained pieces of the capabilities for protecting America from the new kind of threat, but there was no coordination among either the agencies or the pieces. In 2002 the Bush Administration proposed creation of a formal Office of Homeland Security. The initial proposal called for a staff of 169,000 persons and a budget of \$37.4 billion. If that plan were to be realized, the new department would become the third largest with the ninth largest budget at the cabinet level. Tom Ridge or his successor would become a full Cabinet Secretary with the need to be confirmed by and later accountable to the Senate. Pulled into this new department would be the Secret Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, the Federal Protection Service, the newly created Transportation Security Administration, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Domestic Emergency Support Team, the National Domestic Preparedness Office, the Lawrence Livermore National Lab, the Civilian Bio-defense Research Program, the Plum

Island Animal Disease Center, the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, the Federal Computer Incident Response Center, the National Communications Systems, the National Infrastructure Protection Center, and the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center. The political ramifications of this reorganization reverberated throughout Washington and the nation. Many observers were concerned about the distinctions that law enforcement officials would need to make between criminal and terrorist activity. Debate and congressional reactions led to considerable modification of the original proposal.

In conclusion, the key national security bureaucracies experienced considerable change in the period between the early Cold War and the immediate post-September 11 climate. A period that commenced in the mid-1940s with the spotlight on the traditional Departments of State and Defense ended in late 2002 with active participation by the CIA and NSC. In addition, a welter of new organizations and of changed organizational linkages was hatched, and in the process national security acquired a domestic component nearly equal in importance to its foreign policy one.

REDIRECTING POLICIES

The abiding focus of policy in the four decades of Cold War was adding teeth to the overall objective of containment of the communist threat. In part, this meant restoration of Western Europe to political and economic health. The foundation of this policy was laid in the late 1940s. Acceptance of containment as a guide to policy, enunciation of the Truman Doctrine to preserve non-communist governments in Greece and Turkey, and Marshall Plan assistance to West Europe constituted the substance of that foundation. Most of the ensuing Cold War policies were built on that foundation.

Protection of West Europe against communist infiltration took a number of forms. A strong western military presence in West Berlin became a symbol of overall protection of the region. Presidents Kennedy and Reagan made memorable statements in that city with the Berlin Wall as a convenient backdrop and easy target. American concerns about communist influence centered in particular on France and Italy. Both nations had strong domestic communist parties that competed with some success in national and local elections. The high water mark of this concern was no doubt the warnings made by Henry Kissinger to the Italian electorate in the 1970s about the dangers of flirting too intensely with the left. The umbrella of NATO military protection in combination with American leadership of the Alliance provided a veneer of security.

If West Europe was the central theater of concern, the communist empire to the east caught America's eye as well. While the United States never made a substantial move to dethrone communism in the Soviet Union or East Europe, its policies did include countless messages and warnings. Prior to the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, Secretary Dulles made statements of support for the Hungarian freedom fighters. Following the surprise of a Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, President Johnson issued a denunciation of the Soviet move. American policies might have been more forceful had Eisenhower not been preoccupied with the Middle East in 1956 and Johnson with Vietnam in 1968. Later, during the time of the Polish Solidarity challenge in 1980-81 as well as of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter and Reagan Administrations utilized sanctions in the form of economic penalties and boycott of the 1980 Olympics. Further, during the 1970s U.S. policy included at least rhetorical support

for dissidents in the Soviet Union. Intelligence gathering through the CIA and National Security Agency (NSA) supplemented these policies.

Of course, American policies focused on other areas of the world as threats developed. However, for the most part the defined threats in those other areas were linked by policy-makers with the communist challenge in Eurasia. At times, particularly in the 1950s and 1980s, American policy-makers perceived third world threats as flowing from the Soviet Union. Heavy preoccupation with Cuba and Castro is a useful example of these types of concerns. Involvement in the war in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and early 1970s was initially a parallel case. After several years, it had become apparent that the threat was not Moscow but a combination of Vietnamese nationalism and an Asian variant of communism. The Reagan Years involved a revival of U.S. concern about third world communism. The Reagan Doctrine called for a proactive stance in light of perceived communist advances in a number of corners of the globe. Central America was particular target of this policy spotlight. Invasion of Grenada in 1983, efforts to roll back the Sandinista Regime in Nicaragua, and support for the government of El Salvador in the face of the threat from marxist forces are key examples. Viewing all areas of the world through the prism of anti-communism certainly simplified policy, but the cost was myopia with regard to other powerful forces circulating beneath the grid of East versus West. Such forces would burst forth with a fury in the post-Cold War and post-September 11 worlds.

The rapid collapse of the East European dominoes in the fall of 1989 caught the Bush policy team by surprise. Serious academic observers of the process were caught off guard as well. Suddenly, the target of containment had been tamed and transformed. Policy-makers had difficulty defining a set of objectives to replace containment, and similar difficulties occurred in the actual policy area itself. If one looks back over the 1989-2001 period as a whole, one hypothesis would be that preoccupation with the dangers emanating from rogue states replaced the set of Cold War policies designed to contain communism.

Certainly, Saddam Hussein's Iraq fits neatly into the category of rogue states. This leader had invaded Iran in the early 1980s in search of more coastline and access to the Gulf for shipping out Iraqi oil. He had also attacked minority groups within his own country and probably worked on development of a nuclear capability. His August 2, 1990, invasion of Kuwait prompted an immediate American reaction. The Bush Administration mobilized the military and relocated a massive amount of material and personnel to Saudi Arabia under the slogan of "Desert Shield." Following a series of supportive resolutions by the United Nations as well as the U.S. Congress, America and its allies unleashed a "Desert Storm" that resulted in victory within a matter of weeks. In the aftermath of the war, Iraq was subjected to a mix of restrictions on its ability to sell oil as well as to develop nuclear technology.

On the southwest corner of Europe, in the area known as the Balkans, ruled another rogue state dictator. In 1988, Slobodan Milosovic had become head of the Communist Party in the Republic of Serbia within the old Yugoslavia. He was able to eliminate the independent power of both Kosovo and the Voivodina. Those two republics had enjoyed some degree of sovereignty since 1974. After the 1989 East European revolutions further north, Milosevic hung on to power in Serbia and later came to be President of the new Yugoslavia. In turn, he embarked upon successive wars in

Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, in Bosnia in 1992-95, and finally in his own republic of Kosovo in 1999. Always his proclaimed goal was the protection of minority Serbs in the targeted country or region. U.S. policy was very circumspect until 1995, as there was no national interest involved that approximated in importance Persian Gulf oil. At the same time, historically two world wars had originated in the region. In the end, the escalating number of innocent deaths in Bosnia prompted some air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions and finally the hosting of the Dayton Peace Conference. Of course, the Kosovo bloodletting came to an end with a U.S. led series of NATO air strikes on Serbian forces and the restoration of an uneasy peace. After several years of temporizing, the new Kostunica government in Yugoslavia handed over the rogue to The Hague for a war crimes trial.

American security policy impacted a number of other regions and nations in the interval between Cold War and September 11, 2001. If all of those enemies were not the clear-cut rogue states that Iraq and Yugoslavia had been, they were at least serious contenders for that label. North Korea had been a concern for half a century, but its efforts to develop nuclear weapons in the 1990s made it an occasional preoccupation of the United States. Further, the U.S./U.N. policy disaster in Somalia in 1993 was related to the perception that the war lord Aidid was a dictator who needed to be toppled before any stability could be built in that country. The effort to oust him failed, and western forces beat a hasty retreat. U.S. policy concerns in the 1990s about the Cedras dictatorship in Haiti, the brutal Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and occasionally the heavy-handed communist regime in China fit revealed a similar concern with autocratic leaders who played fast and loose with democratic norms.

While the containment policy during the Cold War had been set at the beginning of the conflict and more or less served as a base line for policy, the preoccupation by national security policy leaders with rogue states in the 1990s emerged through a series of seemingly unrelated cases. The common thread was not really apparent until the events of September 11 highlighted the stakes and consequences of leaving such regimes in place in the name of national sovereignty.

In the immediate aftermath of September 11, antiterrorism and counterterrorism became nearly the sole policy concerns of the second Bush Administration. While these policy concerns were projected mainly abroad into areas in which al Qaeda operated, a new, equal policy concern was the home-front. The result was a double-pronged policy that aimed at establishing security on both fronts.

Policy efforts to counter and defeat the terrorist movement that perpetrated the attack on the twin towers centered at first on Afghanistan. Bush convincingly made the case that the Taliban had shielded and even nurtured the growth of al Qaeda under the terrorist bin Laden. Defeat of the Taliban was the first policy requisite and was accomplished with relative speed. The next policy move was the search for the terrorists themselves. Bush argued that the roots and branches of the network involved many other nations. Thus, he cautioned the American public that the battle would be lengthy and would require much patience. American military forces pursued the terrorists into neighboring Pakistan, the Pankisi Gorge in Russia's neighbor Georgia, and the southern islands of the Philippines. Countless other nations were deemed to be possible hideouts of al Qaeda. After a certain quietness fell over Afghanistan, policy focused on the setting

up of a transitional government that would balance various ethnic interests and produce the basis for an eventual democratic transition.

It was also vital to cultivate new allies, and that entailed policy initiatives by nearly all the top level players in the Bush Administration. The “stans” figured importantly in this calculation, for many of those Central Asian states shared borders with the rogue states to the south. In fact, many of the ethnic groups fighting in Afghanistan were also active in countries like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. All of these new allies offered over-flight and landing rights, while two of them, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, provided actual air bases to which allied troops were dispatched. The Cold War had come full circle. Former Central Asian Republics that had been part of the enemy Soviet Union were now American allies in the fight against global terrorism. Other sometime allies took on a new importance, and Pakistan was the most critical player of all. A number of al Qaeda training camps and schools had been located in Pakistan, and its leader General Musharraf was very supportive of the American-led effort. However, there was a strong indigenous Islamic fundamentalist movement that pressured the government to stand up to the West. American support helped this ally retain a modicum of stability in the early period after September 11.

For the first time, domestic or “homeland” security policy became as important as its foreign counterpart. During the early 1950s the McCarthy accusations had centered on the “enemy within.” However, the September 11 attack revealed the poison of a profoundly different and more real “enemy within.” While McCarthy had irrationally targeted the threat of native-born Americans who staffed top positions in the military and State Department, the sober-minded domestic security concerns in late 2001 emphasized the threat of foreign-born citizens who came to the United States, blended into American culture, and manipulated their apparent assimilation in order to both destroy American lives and strike a blow against American culture. The policy response was many-sided. First, the Bush Administration initially decided that military courts should be the setting for trial of captured terrorists. However, rethinking of the matter led to several trials in 2002 in civilian courts. Second, both Congress and President agreed that coordination and information sharing among CIA, FBI, and NSA was an urgent future necessity. Third, there was a powerful policy impulse to protect the security of airports and airplanes. In this connection, the Administration delegated authority to shoot down civilian aircraft to the Pentagon. Establishing security in the airspace over Salt Lake City during the 2002 Winter Olympics was one example. A variety of proposals centered on containing the spread of diseases such as anthrax or smallpox by terrorists seeking to undermine the United States. At the same time, there was strong pressure to ensure that homeland security policy would also include protection of civil liberties of citizens, regardless of their place of origin. All of these policy discussions came to the fore, in particular, on major American holidays, and any future explosion would become a test of the new array of policies.

Evolution of policy over half a century moved from the preoccupation with communism through a scattershot effort to defend against “rogue states” to a focused anti-terrorist effort. In part, the nearly exclusive preoccupation with containment of communism in the Cold War clouded vision that might have seen the emergence of the other two policy problems. In part, the end of the Cold War transformed the global

balance of power in such a way that both rogue states and terrorists had more room to maneuver.

CONCLUSION

Protection of American national security after the September 11 attack mandated attention to objectives, bureaucracies, and policies. All three areas of security experienced major change in the early period after the horrific events. Such adjustments were doubly difficult because the same three areas had experienced major transformations a little over a decade before with the end of the Cold War. While legislators and the public clamored for policy changes after the attacks on the Twin Towers, over the long haul attention to broad, empowering objectives and bureaucratic behavior were equally necessary. In fact, new policies were only possible with both the development of new objectives and refinement of the bureaucracies to put them into effect.